A truly delusional "middle path" for Afghanistan

The best part of this is the opening sentence below. It also has a nice thumbnail description of counterinsurgency: "The principle of counterinsurgency is to focus much more on protecting
the population than on chasing and killing terrorist-insur...gents. The
theory is that if NATO and Afghan forces can provide security (and thus
facilitate the supply of basic services), the Afghan people will shift
their loyalty to their government and thus dry up the Taliban's base of
support." The problem is the purported "middle course" it is reporting on and, implicitly recommending: limiting counterinsurgency to a few major cities. The problem is made obvious by the name its proponents give it: an "enclave strategy." Enclaves are isolated outposts surrounded by hostile territory and are inherently vulnerable. And how would an "enclave" win over the population? The idea is that the enclave would have a "demonstration effect" -- ie show Afghans the virtues of the American way of life. But if the idea is to abandon the countryside, then who is going to maintain order in those areas, where the Taliban recruits? The Taliban, of course! And why would a Pushtun living in a village controlled by the Taliban care about how good life was in an American outpost in Kabul? Obama can solve the Afghanistan mess without sending a lot more troops or leaving the country entirely. - By Fred Kaplan - Slate Magazine

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