Now that the Bush administration, like every other waning U.S. presidency, is making noises about bringing peace to the Middle East, it might be be worth pondering why the last such attempt, in Clinton's final year failed. I wrote the following piece in the fall of 2000. It still represents a cogent and timely analysis of US peacemaking efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
"Since the recent round of violence broke out in the Middle East, U.S. officials have attempted, imperfectly, to avoid blaming either side for the events. Increasingly, though, the question is whether U.S. efforts to play the honest broker themselves contributed to the current conflict.
"Two reasons for blaming the broker have already been articulated by other observers. First, as former President Jimmy Carter predicted over the summer, the administration’s decision to publicly blame Arafat for the failure of the talks have eroded Palestinian confidence in U.S. neutrality. Second, many media reports now suggest that the Clinton administration allowed Barak’s timetable and preferred mode of negotiating to dictate the negotiating process.
"By far the most important reason for questioning U.S. responsibility for the current crisis is the way American authorities handled the inherent tension between the roles of guaranteeing the security of one party while mediating between both. Had the United States chided Israel, for whom U.S. support is never in question, it might have been an act of statesmanship, but the Americans had little credibility to sustain a rebuke of Arafat.
"All of this is made worse by the fact that the American security guarantee is extended to the stronger party in the dispute. In this situation, the burden of proof is on the broker to reassure the weaker party it’s security concerns will also be met. Instead, the United States has been willing to justify an agreement that gives the Palestinians less than they are entitled to under international law, and that would compromise Palestinian security.
"The difference between sovereignty and control is crucial not symbolic. Without sovereignty, Arabs in East Jerusalem would have no protection against any actions the Israelis took on security grounds. “Control” is the same halfway house that the hardline Israeli government of Menachem Begin offered Palestinians in the West Bank generally and is essentially what the Palestinian authority enjoys in many West Bank towns today.
"Recent Israeli actions in these towns make clear how inadequate a compromise “control” is. Matters are made worse by the Israeli insistence that Jewish settlers be allowed to remain in the West Bank and Gaza, with Israeli protection, even though the settlers would be a constant flashpoint for confrontation and an invitation to Israeli intervention.
"Both U.S. and Israeli officials have sometimes suggested that the Palestinians should accept Barak’s offer because it is more than they have now or could hope to win by force. The argument is both specious and dangerous. It raises the question of why a U.S.-brokered negotiation is necessary to produce an outcome dictated by the balance of power and inevitably invites Palestinian efforts to use force to alter that balance. Palestinians have not forgotten, if Israelis have, that it was the high cost to Israeli society of the intifada that led to the 1993 Oslo accords.
"The contrast between the recent Camp David fiasco and the original Camp David agreement could not be more stark. Then, as now, the Arabs insisted on complete withdrawal from territories conquered in the 1967 War (except for the Gaza strip which it was understood would be part of a Palestinian settlement). Then, as now, Israel insisted on keeping some gains, for its own security and to protect settlers. Then, as now, the argument was made that Egypt would gain more from a partial withdrawal than it could hope to win by force.
"In Camp David I, however, American pressure and security assurances led Israel to withdraw from the entire Sinai. Israel was rewarded with twenty years of peace, while the U.S. won a new ally. The loser, of course, was Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who began the process and was assassinated for his troubles.
"Both the original Camp David accords and the record of the Palestinian authority show that, even in the Middle East, good fences make good neighbors. If the United States wishes to play a positive role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the American security guarantee has to become an instrument for peace, not a license for Israel to act with impunity."
Monday, July 31, 2006
Heel, Tony, Heel
There can be few sights more embarrassing than watching British PM Tony Blair, once again, attempt fruitlessly to live up to his promise that the US-UK "alliance" somehow gives the British Empire-turned-Emirate some influence over the use and abuse of American power. Blair's sad little dance around his desire -- and everyone else's -- to see an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon and the US insistence on giving Israel its head only heightened the impression that he has turned the "special relatoinship" between London and Washington into one between a country squire and his overeager retriever. While Israel is let off the leash to go and mangle innocent neighbors, Tony is called sharply to heel.
Thursday, April 20, 2006
India's recurring reservations rumble
After a long spell on the back burner, the issue of 'reservations" (preferential or affirmative action quotas) are again a major topic in Indian politics. India's central government -- or more appropriately, the minister for Human Resource Development, Arjun Singh -- has announced that the government would like to implement reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in elite, central government sponsored educational institutions, the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs). These would be in addition to the existing reservations in educational institutions and government employment for the most marginalized social groups the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs).
The latest proposal has brought protests and condemnation not only from the urban middle and upper classes, but also, interestingly, from big business. Big business seems to have become interested as the result of a a speech by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in which he referred to the need for "socially and economically broadbased" employment to be part of the growth process. This has resulted in a flurry of protests from major private firms concerned that reservations in the private sector are next. Reservations in the private sector have, in fact been demanded by advocates of reaservations for a while but without the endorsement of the two leading national parties. But business groups are also condemining the proposed reservation in the IITs and IIMs as likely to dilute the meritocratic recruitment hat the they hold to be India's competitive edge. But business groups seem to be missing the real thrust of the prime minister's speech. His concern was even broader, for example that the current econmic model, driven by white collar jobs was not creating enough employment. Thus the prime minister excplicitly called for an expansion in manufacturing, not an area affected by the reservations in IIMs and IITs.
In many ways the debate over the IITs and IIMs and the private sector reflects the fact that the sources of elite status have shifted significantly since 1990, when the government of then prime minister V.P. Singh announced the introduction of reservations for the Other Backward Classes. Whereas even in the 1980s, access to government employment was the major avenue of upward mobility, since the liberalization of 1991, the private sector has been the major engine of growth. Indeed, it is likely that the threat of reservations made the middle class more amenable to liberalization. That the current proposal is made by a government headed by the architect of liberalization, the then finance minister Manmohan Singh, is viewed as a paradox, as the elite who benefited the most from liberalization are viewed as Manmohan Singh's constituency.
Meantime the debate over the merits of reservations proceeds along predictable lines. Supporters argue that quotas only open doors for members of disadvantaged communities who then have to make the most of these opportunities. Opponents argue that they sap inititiative and that those who really need it don't get reservations. So, for example, this piece by Surjit Singh Bhalla, a well-known pollster presents some fascinating figures on the rate of enrolment in college by high school graduates of different groups to argue that the group that really needs it reservations are Muslims. Bhalla's criteria for determining whether a group needs reservations, though, is based on the proportion of high school graduates proceeding to college -- largely the same among all groups -- rather then the proportion of college graduates in the group as a whole. This is a fascinating criterion that deserves further comment but will have to wait for another post. One point worth mentioning: as Bhalla correctly observes, the difference between the two is that members of less privileged groups are far less likely to have the opportunity to finish high school.
The argument that the truly needy do not get reservations is often accompanied by calls for broadening investment in education. Another well-known public figure, K.P.S. Gill, the police official credited with crushing the Punjab insurgency in the early 1990s, argues that the problem is the lack of investment in rural education. This is obviously worthwhile, but like liberalization not a call that is made with nearly as much passion when reservations is not an issue.
Many are predicting direly that Arjun Singh's -- and Manmohan Singh's? -- announcement will have the same results as V.P. Singh's announcement led to the fall of his minority coalition government -- supported by both the Hindu right and the communist left -- and the splintering of his own party into the many regional factions that still occupy a significant chunk of the parliament. This has not happened and seems unlikely. The Congress party's core vote base -- the rural poor --are neither threatened nor empowered by reservations, their lives are more likely to be affected by the nationwide employment guarantee program just launched by the government. The reservations issue is more about alliance building with those pesky regional fragmetns of the Janata Dal, and perhaps seeking to create an alternative to the ever problematic support of the Left Front which continues to veto the labor reforms that would generate growth in manufacturing.
The latest proposal has brought protests and condemnation not only from the urban middle and upper classes, but also, interestingly, from big business. Big business seems to have become interested as the result of a a speech by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in which he referred to the need for "socially and economically broadbased" employment to be part of the growth process. This has resulted in a flurry of protests from major private firms concerned that reservations in the private sector are next. Reservations in the private sector have, in fact been demanded by advocates of reaservations for a while but without the endorsement of the two leading national parties. But business groups are also condemining the proposed reservation in the IITs and IIMs as likely to dilute the meritocratic recruitment hat the they hold to be India's competitive edge. But business groups seem to be missing the real thrust of the prime minister's speech. His concern was even broader, for example that the current econmic model, driven by white collar jobs was not creating enough employment. Thus the prime minister excplicitly called for an expansion in manufacturing, not an area affected by the reservations in IIMs and IITs.
In many ways the debate over the IITs and IIMs and the private sector reflects the fact that the sources of elite status have shifted significantly since 1990, when the government of then prime minister V.P. Singh announced the introduction of reservations for the Other Backward Classes. Whereas even in the 1980s, access to government employment was the major avenue of upward mobility, since the liberalization of 1991, the private sector has been the major engine of growth. Indeed, it is likely that the threat of reservations made the middle class more amenable to liberalization. That the current proposal is made by a government headed by the architect of liberalization, the then finance minister Manmohan Singh, is viewed as a paradox, as the elite who benefited the most from liberalization are viewed as Manmohan Singh's constituency.
Meantime the debate over the merits of reservations proceeds along predictable lines. Supporters argue that quotas only open doors for members of disadvantaged communities who then have to make the most of these opportunities. Opponents argue that they sap inititiative and that those who really need it don't get reservations. So, for example, this piece by Surjit Singh Bhalla, a well-known pollster presents some fascinating figures on the rate of enrolment in college by high school graduates of different groups to argue that the group that really needs it reservations are Muslims. Bhalla's criteria for determining whether a group needs reservations, though, is based on the proportion of high school graduates proceeding to college -- largely the same among all groups -- rather then the proportion of college graduates in the group as a whole. This is a fascinating criterion that deserves further comment but will have to wait for another post. One point worth mentioning: as Bhalla correctly observes, the difference between the two is that members of less privileged groups are far less likely to have the opportunity to finish high school.
The argument that the truly needy do not get reservations is often accompanied by calls for broadening investment in education. Another well-known public figure, K.P.S. Gill, the police official credited with crushing the Punjab insurgency in the early 1990s, argues that the problem is the lack of investment in rural education. This is obviously worthwhile, but like liberalization not a call that is made with nearly as much passion when reservations is not an issue.
Many are predicting direly that Arjun Singh's -- and Manmohan Singh's? -- announcement will have the same results as V.P. Singh's announcement led to the fall of his minority coalition government -- supported by both the Hindu right and the communist left -- and the splintering of his own party into the many regional factions that still occupy a significant chunk of the parliament. This has not happened and seems unlikely. The Congress party's core vote base -- the rural poor --are neither threatened nor empowered by reservations, their lives are more likely to be affected by the nationwide employment guarantee program just launched by the government. The reservations issue is more about alliance building with those pesky regional fragmetns of the Janata Dal, and perhaps seeking to create an alternative to the ever problematic support of the Left Front which continues to veto the labor reforms that would generate growth in manufacturing.
War, Peace and Blowback in the Subcontinent
Talks between India and Pakistan continue and steps toward normalization. This piece in Outlook gives an optimistic overview of recent moves. The piece also lists a host of provocations, mainly terrorist acts in India, that could have derailed the process but did not. At the same time, a second piece suggests that Indian intelligence is now supporting a rebellion in Balochistan province in Pakistan, using its improving ties with Afghanistan to conduct training camps. An interview with Mushahid Hussein chairman of Pakistan's Senate Foreign Relations committee and a close ally of Pakistani President Musharraf elaborates on the claim.
This would, of course be nothing new in the region. India supported Bangladesh's successful secesson from Pakistan in the early 1970s and the ongoing Sri Lankan Tamil struggle in the 1980s. Pakistan has supported a separatist insurgency in India's part of the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir for the last fifteen years and attempted to do so off and on in previous decades. However, the active support of an insurgency in Pakistan would be a departure from India's strategy in recent years, which has been to try to take the moral high ground by trying to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. The Pakistani military has been worried for some time that India's attempts to woo Afghanistan are simply an effort to encircle them. So the question is, is it true and how does it fit in with the the "peace process?"
Well in one sense it fits in all too well. Today. It is easy to see how Indian security planners could decide that putting a little pressure on Pakistan's western front would soften Pakistan up and convince them to ease up on Kashmir, especially at a time when the Pakistani military are already tied down in great numbers in the Pushtun areas of Waziristan hunting Taleban. Indeed, Indian security planners are probably chuckling to themselves about the ways in which Pakistan's support for the Taleban, and the connectiones between those and Pakistan's support for the Kashmir insurgency are "blowing back" on Pakistan. And the average Indian newswatcher if they think anything of this, probably think it's about time India did something like this.
Yet, it is worth thinking about whether this effort to open up a new front on Pakistan could itself "blow back" on India. In the 1980s the Indian government's support for Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka eventually led to Rajiv Gandhi's assassination by Tamil separatists. India's geopoltiical strategy toward Afghanistan is not new, it goes back to the 1970s and continued through Indian support for the Northern Alliance. But when the Taleban came to power the "long friendship" between India and Afghanistan did not help. The recent controversy over the conversion of an Afghan Muslim to Christianity does suggest that there might be strong support for a Taleban type regime in the future. India can build relations with Islamist regimes-- witness Indian ties with Iran. Does India need to align itself against Islamist forces in Afghanistan?
This would, of course be nothing new in the region. India supported Bangladesh's successful secesson from Pakistan in the early 1970s and the ongoing Sri Lankan Tamil struggle in the 1980s. Pakistan has supported a separatist insurgency in India's part of the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir for the last fifteen years and attempted to do so off and on in previous decades. However, the active support of an insurgency in Pakistan would be a departure from India's strategy in recent years, which has been to try to take the moral high ground by trying to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. The Pakistani military has been worried for some time that India's attempts to woo Afghanistan are simply an effort to encircle them. So the question is, is it true and how does it fit in with the the "peace process?"
Well in one sense it fits in all too well. Today. It is easy to see how Indian security planners could decide that putting a little pressure on Pakistan's western front would soften Pakistan up and convince them to ease up on Kashmir, especially at a time when the Pakistani military are already tied down in great numbers in the Pushtun areas of Waziristan hunting Taleban. Indeed, Indian security planners are probably chuckling to themselves about the ways in which Pakistan's support for the Taleban, and the connectiones between those and Pakistan's support for the Kashmir insurgency are "blowing back" on Pakistan. And the average Indian newswatcher if they think anything of this, probably think it's about time India did something like this.
Yet, it is worth thinking about whether this effort to open up a new front on Pakistan could itself "blow back" on India. In the 1980s the Indian government's support for Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka eventually led to Rajiv Gandhi's assassination by Tamil separatists. India's geopoltiical strategy toward Afghanistan is not new, it goes back to the 1970s and continued through Indian support for the Northern Alliance. But when the Taleban came to power the "long friendship" between India and Afghanistan did not help. The recent controversy over the conversion of an Afghan Muslim to Christianity does suggest that there might be strong support for a Taleban type regime in the future. India can build relations with Islamist regimes-- witness Indian ties with Iran. Does India need to align itself against Islamist forces in Afghanistan?
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